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Abstract 
Evidence is presented on the long and short run relationship between the money market 
interest rate and loan and deposit interest rates charged by individual Spanish banks 
between 1988 and 2003. The results indicate that such relationships have been determined 
by a mixture of adjustment costs and market power of banks, which creates interest rate 
rigidity and asymmetries in the speed at which increases and decreases in the money 
market interest rate are translated into banking interest rates. We also find that the price 
adjustment speed first decreases and later increases with market concentration, which is 
consistent with predictions from models that assume quantity adjustment costs. 
JEL: D40, L11. 
Key words: interest rates rigidity, quantity adjustment costs, market power, market 
concentration. 
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1 Introduction 
The speed and symmetry of price adjustments to changes in market conditions or to 
macroeconomic shocks affect economic efficiency since there may be missallocation 
costs when prices are not in equilibrium. Price rigidity has been related to market structure 
[Means (1935), Hall and Hitch (1939)] and, more recently, to costs faced by firms when they 
change prices. The costs can be direct, for example menu costs [Rotemberg (1982); 
Rotemberg and Saloner (1986); Benabou and Gertner (1993)], or indirect when firms 
face quantity adjustment costs [Ginsburgh and Michel (1988); Pindyck (1993), (1994); 
Borenstein et al. (1997)]. Fixed or variable costs at changing prices, together with a price 
inelastic demand for the product, cause changes in the profit maximizing prices to lag behind 
changes in production costs. One important piece of research is to study the effect of market 
power on the price adjustment speed [Carlton (1986)]. 
In the case of loan and deposit interest rates, the flexibility in the adjustments to 
changes in the money market interest rate determines the effectiveness of the monetary 
policy and the relationship between money supply and aggregate output. Research on 
interest rate rigidity using bank level data started in the US with papers such as Hannan 
and Berger (1991), Neumark and Sharpe (1992) and Hannan (1994) on deposit interest 
rates; and Ausubel (1989) and Calem et al. (1995) on credit card loans. More recent pieces of 
work focus on European countries, such as Hofman and Mizen (2004) for the UK, 
Gambacorta (2004) for Italy, Weth (2002) for Germany and De Graeve et al. (2004) for 
Belgium.1 
This paper develops a microeconomic analysis of price rigidity in loan and deposit 
markets to changes in the money market interest rate. Unlike Hannan and Berger (1991), 
which carries out a menu cost analysis, we do so allowing for adjustment costs in the 
quantity of loans and deposits [Flannery (1982)]. The empirical study uses annual interest 
rates, quoted on a monthly basis by individual Spanish banks, of four loan and four deposit 
products. In this period, nominal money market interest rates evolved from a high level 
of 15% in 1989 to a low rate around 3% in 2003. Our research questions include the 
magnitude and stability of the adjustment speed over time, its symmetry to an increase or a 
decrease in the money market interest rate, differences across bank products and the 
relationship between price rigidity and variables associated with market structure and 
behaviour of banks, such as market concentration, demand growth and price collusion. 
As one of its relevant contributions, this paper contains a thorough discussion of the 
relationship between market power and the price adjustment speed under supply adjustment 
costs (versus direct price adjustment costs) and under alternative market structures and 
behaviour of banks. Theoretical results show that, when price adjustment costs are direct 
(for example menu costs), factors that lower bank market power (such as the deposit supply 
                                                                          
1. Other related papers are Moore et al. (1988) and Diebold and Sharpe (1990), which study interest rates rigidity in 
the US using aggregate deposit interest rates. Scholnick (1999) does the same but with loan and deposit interest rates 
from US and Canada. Barreira et al. (1999) and Oroz and Salas (2003) perform a similar exercise for the case of Spain 
using aggregate loan and deposit interest rates. Hannan and Liang (1992) use the same US individual bank data on 
deposit interest rates as Hannan and Berger (1991) to study the relationship between market concentration and the long 
run pass-through parameter of changes in the base rate to changes in deposit rates. Sastre (1997) replicates the 
analysis for the case of Spain. Berstein and Fuentes (2003) study the relationship between price rigidity and market 
concentration for the case of deposit interest rates in Chile. 
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and loan demand slopes) increase the price adjustment speed. In this situation, conditions 
that favor higher bank market power also increase interest rate rigidity. However, when costs 
of changing interest rates are indirect (for example quantity adjustment costs), the relationship 
between market power and price rigidity is more ambiguous and higher market power can be 
associated with higher or lower speed in price adjustment. 
This paper studies interest rate rigidity in loan and deposit products of different 
maturity using bank level data and actual interest rates charged by Spanish banks that 
represent over 90% of the Spanish retail banking industry. Unlike deposits, loan markets 
are affected by information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders that result in 
adverse selection and credit rationing [Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)]. Although much less 
is known about it, credit rationing may create interest rate rigidity even in the absence of 
adjustment costs, especially in response to upward changes in the interest rates [Berger and 
Udell (1992)]. The study is performed under a unified framework for both types of bank 
products and considering that price rigidity can be the result of quantity adjustment costs. 
Previous work with bank level data in the US has concentrated mainly on interest rate rigidity 
for deposits and focused on loans only in particular cases, such as credit cards. Moreover, 
the underlying theory is not always outlined in detail, especially in some papers [such as 
Neumark and Sharpe (1992)] that make no explicit distinction between predictions from menu 
and supply adjustment costs. 
Papers on interest rate rigidity in other European countries are mostly concerned 
with banks characteristics that affect price rigidity within the broader topic of interest rate 
transmissions after monetary policy decisions. Papers that also use bank level data, such 
as De Graeve et al. (2004), study prime rates fixed by banks but not the actual interest rates 
at which transactions are made. As for this paper, it uses actual interest rates charged by 
banks in both loans and deposits and it is mainly concerned with the effects of market 
structure, instead of bank characteristics, on interest rate rigidity. Finally, the long period of 
time covered by the data permits to analyse the stability of the adjustment speed over time 
and evaluate the results in terms of the effects of introducing the Euro as a single European 
currency. 
Overall, this paper is inspired by the Industrial Organisation tradition where market 
performance is associated, in a negative way, with relative profit margin (as measuring 
market power) and, positively, with price adjustment speed. Higher relative profit 
margin implies higher dead weight losses and therefore, it can be considered as an inverse 
measure of static efficiency. A higher price adjustment speed shall be an attribute of market 
flexibility and lower misallocation costs, and then it can be associated with dynamic efficiency. 
Both market power and the speed of price adjustment are endogenous variables that depend 
on the market structure, the behaviour of banks and the nature of the adjustment costs. 
Therefore, the empirical study of the interest rate adjustment over time will be highly 
informative about the evolution of market power of Spanish banks. 
Our results give evidence for substantial and non-symmetric rigidity in Spanish 
interest rates, although the actual adjustment speed varies across products. We also find that 
the non-monotonic response of the adjustment speed to market concentration is consistent 
with an oligopolistic market structure where banks face quantity adjustment costs in loans 
and deposits. Loan interest rate rigidity is lower among commercial banks than among 
savings banks, but no difference is observed between both types of banks in case of 
deposits. Larger banks show higher interest rate rigidity than small banks, but the effect 
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of size is consistently statistically significant only in loans. Interest rate rigidity is higher in 
markets with higher population growth and the economic significance of the effect of market 
growth on price rigidity is higher in deposits than in loan products. The Euro has not altered 
the basic pattern of interest rate rigidity in loans and deposits. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the conceptual framework 
under which we study interest rates rigidity and its determinants. In section 3 we present 
the data and the methodology used; section 4 contains the empirical results from the 
estimation of models that measure and explain interest rate adjustments to changes in 
the money market interest rate; finally, section 5 presents a discussion of the main results and 
conclusions. 
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2 Theory and literature review 
It is often assumed in the interest rate transmission literature that interest rate adjustments 
will take place at a lower pace in markets where firms have more market power [Hannan and 
Berger (1991); Rosen (2002)]. This assumption is also implicit in all the empirical literature 
on transmissions of changes in monetary conditions [Neumark and Sharpe (1992); Hofmann 
and Mizen (2004); Gambacorta (2004); De Graeve et al. (2004)]. If this was true, factors that 
increase market power would lower market efficiency in both static terms (higher relative 
profit margin or Lerner index) and dynamic terms (low price adjustment speed). However, 
as Borenstein and Shepard (2002) indicate, the link between market power and price 
adjustment speed is not as straightforward as it may seem. In this section we present an 
overview of factors that determine market power and their relationship with the speed of 
interest rate adjustments for bank deposits. We consider different combinations of banks’ 
decision variables (price or quantity), market structures (monopoly, oligopoly), behaviour of 
firms (conjectural variations) and sources of adjustment costs (in price or quantity changes). 
Formal analysis of deposit markets 
Banks take savings in the form of deposits from households and lend these funds out for 
investment. If markets were perfectly competitive, banks would pay an interest rate on 
deposits equal to the marginal cost of capital, less any cost of doing business; and borrowers 
would pay for loans the same cost of capital plus a compensation for credit risk and marginal 
operating costs.2 Actually, loan and deposit markets depart from perfect competition; thereby 
the study of interest rate formation in these markets will have to take into account that market 
characteristics may have an effect on interest rates paid or charged by banks.3 
Assume a deposit market with a linear supply function given 
by
dd rarD β+=)( , where D(·) is the volume of deposits as a function of the interest rate 
rd, and a and β are parameters. The value of a gives the supply of deposits when 0=dr  
and it is expected to be positive since deposits include liquid assets for cash payments. 
The non-negative parameter β is the slope of the supply curve; a value equal to zero 
indicates a totally inelastic supply; then, higher β implies a more elastic supply function. 
Each bank is price-taker in the securities market, where it can borrow and lend any amount 
of funds at a given interest rate denoted by R. Finally, changes in R are taken as unexpected 
and permanent. 
Banks face costs for changing interest rates over time. Sometimes these costs are 
direct, as menu costs [Hannan and Berger (1991)] or costs that arise because these changes 
displease customers [Okun (1981)]. Other times the costs are indirect, as when changes in 
interest rates induce changes in the quantities of supplied deposits and eventually produce 
quantity adjustment costs. Flannery (1982) describes the conditions that determine specific 
investment costs incurred in establishing retail deposit relationships and justifies that bank 
                                                                          
2. As in Flannery (1982), our analysis and inferences concerning deposit market behaviour are independent of the 
scenario that characterizes loan markets. This is due to the presumption of a competitive interbank funds market and 
that production of deposits is independent of that of loans. 
3. Berger and Hannan (1989) find a negative and significant cross section link between market concentration and 
interest rates in deposits. 
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and depositor will share these costs. For convenience, it is assumed that the adjustment cost 
function is quadratic4 
( )21)()(2 dtdtt rDrDcAC −−=  (1) 
where c is a non-negative parameter. 
2.1 Monopoly versus competitive pricing 
If we consider the collusive (or monopoly) situation in the deposit market, assuming that all 
operating costs are fixed and are excluded from the behavioural model5, the monopoly profit 
maximising problem will be 
t
d
t
d
tt
r
ACrarRMax
d
t
−+− ))(( β . 
Solving for the first order conditions we have 
t
d
t
d
t Rrr γλµ ++= −1 , (2) 
where ),2(/ ββµ ca +−= )2/( ββλ cc +=  and )2/(1 βγ c+= .  
Equation (2) implies that the money market interest rate Rt is transmitted into the 
deposit interest rate, since γ > 0; but the transmission is lagged as long as λ > 0. A sufficient 
condition for the existence of this lag is a positive value of the adjustment cost parameter c.  
The deposit interest rate in the long run equilibrium rd* is obtained when
d
t
d
t rr 1−= . 
Solving (2) under this condition we obtain, 
t
d
t Rr 10* αα += , (3) 
where βα /0 a−=  and 2/1)1/(1 =−= λγα  is the pass-through parameter, which 
together with the constant, determines the long run relationship between the money market 
and the deposit interest rates. From (2) and taking into account (3) we can write, 
)*( 11
d
t
d
t
d
t
d
t rrrr −− −=− δ , (4) 
where )2/(2)1( βλδ c+=−= . The parameter δ gives the proportion of the difference 
between the desired long run interest rate and the past interest rate that is translated into 
 
                                                                          
4. The convex cost function is assumed for convenience. Ginsburgh and Michel (1988) study more general cost 
functions.  
5. This assumption is maintained throughout the paper. The conclusions would be the same if costs were variable but 
additive to the base interest rate and independent of it. Notice also that, in order to simplify the exposition, in the 
monopoly solution all deposits are assumed to be produced by only one bank. 
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actual changes in deposit interest rates at period t. We shall refer to the parameter δ as the 
transmission parameter.  
The Lerner index in the long run profit maximising solution is given by 
)./()(/)( aRaRrrR dd −+=− ββ  
Note that the pass-through parameter 2/11 =Mα  is constant, and consequently, it 
is independent of the demand and cost function parameters. On the other hand, the 
transmission parameter )2/(2)1( βλδ cM +=−= decreases with the slope of the supply 
function (β) and the parameter of the cost function (c). As for the Lerner index, it decreases 
with β. Therefore, under the assumptions of the model, higher slope of the deposit supply 
function decreases both market power and speed in interest rate adjustment. 
Assume now that interest rate is set at the competitive level, that is, the deposit 
interest rate in the equilibrium satisfies the condition of marginal revenue (R) net of marginal 
adjustment cost ( )( 1
d
t
d
t rrc −−β ) equal to the interest rate (rd). Solving this equation it can 
be shown that the transmission parameter for the competitive market solution is equal 
to )1/(1)1( βλδ cPC +=−= . Thereby, under adjustment costs, price rigidity will also be 
observed in markets where firms set price equal to marginal cost (including marginal 
adjustment costs). As in the monopolistic framework, the adjustment speed under perfect 
competition will decrease with the parameter of the adjustment cost function and with the 
slope of the supply function. 
Comparing the adjustment speed under monopoly and under perfect competition, 
we find that δPC < δM; that is, under quantity adjustment costs the adjustment speed is higher 
in a monopoly than in a perfectly competitve market.6 
2.2 Oligopolistic competition 
Assume now an oligopoly with n banks, each of them offering deposits which are 
perceived as perfect substitutes among other banks’ deposits in the same market 
(homogeneous products). Let v be the conjectural variation of banks which summarizes 
the response of each one to quantity decisions of the other competitors. It can be 
shown that the respective parameters of the long run equilibrium rate in equation (3) 
are now )1(/0 νβα ++−= naO and )1/(1 να ++= nnO . On the other hand, the 
transmission parameter in the dynamic adjustment process [equation (4)] is equal 
to ))1/(1/(1)1( vncO +++=−= βλδ .7 Notice that if there was just one bank 
(and consequently, no conjectural variations) the long and short run equilibria parameters 
would coincide with those obtained above in the monopoly case. 
                                                                          
6. Borenstein and Shepard (2002) explain that the difference between monopoly and perfect competition is that in the 
former, marginal costs (including adjustment costs) are set equal to marginal revenue in the profit maximising solution, 
whereas in perfect competition they are set equal to price. Depending on the functional form of the demand function, its 
slope will be higher or lower than the slope of the marginal revenue and this will determine in which of the two 
situations (monopoly or perfect competition) the adjustment is faster. The results we present in the paper correspond 
to linear functions and extensions to other functional forms should be developed in detail. 
7. This is the result of Ginsburg and Michel (1988). 
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As in the monopoly solution, the transmission parameter (δ) decreases with the 
adjustment cost parameter (c) and with the slope of the supply function (β). Nevertheless, 
now it increases with the number of firms in the market (n) and with the conjectural 
variation (v). The conjectural variation can be itself endogenous and determined in a positive 
way by the market concentration [Stigler (1964); Rotemberg and Saloner (1986)]. Thereby, a 
higher n has a positive direct effect on the adjustment speed, but a negative indirect one 
as long as conjectural variations are endogenous and negatively related to the number of 
banks (v would be a decreasing function of n). On the other hand, it is well known that in an 
oligopoly with homogeneous products the long run Lerner index in the equilibrium solution is 
inversely related to the number of firms and to the elasticity of the supply function; and 
positively with the conjectural variation [Cowling and Waterson (1976)]. 
In oligopoly, for a given conjectural variation, a larger number of firms in the market 
increase price adjustment speed and decrease bank market power. Therefore, as long 
as the conjectural variation is given, increases in the market structure variable (n) have a 
positive effect in both aspects of efficiency –in the static one through a lower profit margin; 
and in dynamic terms, by achieving a higher price adjustment speed. As for the conjectural 
variation variable (ν), increases in it have a positive effect on dynamic efficiency but a negative 
effect on static efficiency. Finally, as opposed to these effects, a higher supply function 
slope (β) decreases dynamic efficiency and increases the efficiency in static terms. 
2.3 Direct price adjustment costs and product differentiation 
Let us consider now a change in the hypothesis about the nature of the adjustment cost 
so that the costs of changing prices are direct (like menu costs). To maintain the basic 
assumptions and facilitate the comparison between results, assume that the adjustment 
cost function is again quadratic with parameter c, but in terms of interest rates instead of 
deposit volumes.8 Assume also that banks offer a differentiated product in two different 
market structures, monopoly and oligopoly with price competition. 
Under monopoly, the pass-through parameter is again constant and equal to 1/2 
(α1=1/2). The Lerner index in equilibrium is also the same but now the slope of the supply 
function refers to each individual bank. Yet, the transmission parameter for each bank 
is now )2/1(1 i
M
i c βδ += . Thus, the speed of price adjustment δ increases with β, 
the opposite result found for the case of quantity adjustment costs.9 A monopolist has the 
same profit maximizing solution choosing quantities than choosing prices; if the slope of 
the supply function reduces the speed of price adjustment in the former (quantities), it has 
to increase it in the later (prices) since the slopes of the direct and inverse supply functions 
are also inversely related. With direct price adjustment costs and monopoly, a higher slope of 
the supply function implies less price rigidity and lower market power. 
The case of oligopoly and product differentiation can be studied assuming 
Bertrand-type competition with n banks symmetrically located around the Salop circle. Total 
demand is normalised to the length of the circle and made equal to 1; and t refers to the 
transportation cost per unit of distance.10 It is immediate to show that, in the symmetric 
                                                                          
8. Quadratic cost functions would be consistent with the type of explanation presented in Okun (1981). On hte other 
hand, menu costs imply a fixed cost of changing prices, not a variable one as that previously. Hannan and Berger (1991) 
study the case of menu costs and obtain similar qualitative results than those presented here. 
9. Hannan and Berger (1991) assume monopolistic competition where each bank faces a slope of the deposit supply 
function that increases with the number of competitors in the market. Under this assumption the speed of adjustment 
would be an increasing function of the number of banks in the market. 
10. See Tirole (1988), chapter 7. 
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transportation cost per unit of distance.10 It is immediate to show that, in the symmetric 
equilibrium solution, the pass-through parameter is now equal to one (α1=1) and the 
transmission parameter is )/1/()1( βννδ cD +−−= , where t/1=β . On the other 
hand, in equilibrium, the Lerner index is given by ))(/()(/)( tvRnnvtrrr dd +++=− . 
Therefore, market power increases with t (lower β) and with the conjectural variation v; and 
decreases with the number of banks n, and the money market interest rate R. 
Changes in the slope of the supply function and in the conjectural variation affect 
the interest rate adjustment speed and the market power of banks in the same direction. The 
number of banks does not directly affect the price adjustment speed; however, if a major 
number of banks implies lower conjectural variation, more banks would then also imply less 
price rigidity. 
Given the diversity of results depending on the assumption about market structure 
and behaviour of banks, table 1 presents a summary of effects of parameter changes into 
market power and price adjustment speed. The summary makes clear that, only under 
the assumption of direct price adjustment costs, the factors that lower market power increase 
the price adjustment speed at the same time. Therefore, only in this case, we can predict 
a positive association between market power and interest rate rigidity. Under quantity 
adjustment costs the conclusions can differ depending on the market structure parameter. 
Empirical analysis should help to discern the most appropriate description or 
modeling of reality. For example, one of the variables observed more often is the number of 
banks in the market or its inverse (that is, the concentration index). If conjectural variation 
is meant to be an increasing function of market concentration, then from δD derived above, a 
non-monotonic effect of the number of banks on the price adjustment speed would be 
consistent with supply adjustment costs in the case of oligopoly with non differentiated 
products. On the other hand, a non-negative relationship between the number of banks and 
the price adjustment speed would be consistent with product differentiation and direct price 
adjustment costs. 
2.4 Related literature and hypothesis 
Inspired by Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), Hannan and Berger (1991) studied deposit 
interest rate rigidity under the assumption of menu costs and monopolistic competition. 
Their main prediction is that the incentives to change prices increase with the slope of the 
deposit supply function.11 Hannan and Berger (1991) also assumes that the slope parameter 
will increase with the number of firms in the market; then, the slope and the adjustment 
speed will be lower in more concentrated markets. 
Other sources of market power of banks referred to in the literature are consumers’ 
search costs [Ausubel (1989); Calem and Mester (1995); Rosen (2002); Martín et al. (2005)] 
and switching costs [Sharpe (1997)]. The costs and benefits –for banks’ customers– of 
searching for product substitutes and lower interest rates may be different depending on 
the products and consumer groups. For example, Sorensen (2000) for drugs and Martín 
et al. (2005) for banking products find that the incentives of searching increase with the 
                                                                          
10. See Tirole (1988), chapter 7. 
11. This is consistent with that resulting from δM and δD. Moreover, the comparison of the two transmission parameters 
makes clear that, under price competition and direct price adjustment costs, a monopolist will adjust prices at a lower 
pace than a duopolist, since δD is higher than δM for given values of cost and supply parameters. 
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higher volume of balances. These factors, together with the assumption that banking 
products with longer maturity have more substitutes both in loans (financial markets, retained 
earnings) and deposits (investment funds) [De Graeve et al. (2004)], should contribute to 
increase supply function slopes for banks. However, the effect of these factors on the 
adjustment speed is ambiguous since, as our model shows, it depends on whether 
the adjustment costs of changing interest rates are direct (price) or indirect (quantity). 
The arguments are similar when borrowers and depositors face costs of changing 
banks, although these costs are likely to vary among products and customers groups. For 
example, better-informed customers may have more alternatives to choose from than those 
less informed [Rosen (2002)]; thereby, a market with more informed customers and lower 
switching costs is likely to turn out to be portrayed by a steeper deposit supply function and 
lower profit margins for each individual bank. However, again no prediction can be made 
about the effect of switching and search costs on price rigidity until we know the nature of 
the adjustment costs. 
On the empirical side, several studies have evaluated the transmission of changes in 
the money market interest rate into changes of loan and deposit interest rates using bank 
level data from different countries: Neumark and Sharpe (1992) for the US, Berstein and 
Fuentes (2003) for Chile, Gambacorta (2004) for Italy, Hofmann and Mizen (2004) for the UK, 
De Graeve et al. (2004) for Belgium and Weth (2002) for Germany. In general, the main 
interests of those analyses are (1) to evaluate the responsiveness of interest rates to 
monetary policies and (2) to stress banks’ characteristics, such as capitalisation and liquidity, 
as determinants of the adjustment speed. When interpreting the results in terms of variables 
of market competition, the implicit assumption in all papers, despite not being supported by 
any formal analysis or detailed theoretical discussion, is that market factors that foster a lower 
bank market power increase at the same time the adjustment speed. Nevertheless, as we 
have shown in this paper, this is not straightforward. 
2.5 Loan interest rates 
Loan markets are affected by information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders that 
end up creating problems of adverse selection and moral hazard [Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)]. 
One of the consequences of adverse selection is the possibility of credit rationing; in other 
words, banks may decide to limit the credit amount given to a particular borrower before 
the point where interest rate would raise high enough to equal supply to demand. In such a 
case, banks are reluctant to raise loan interest rates in order to avoid attracting high-risk 
projects or borrowers. According to Berger and Udell (1992), a “key testable implication of 
credit rationing is that commercial loan rate is sticky, that is, it does not fully respond 
to changes in open market rates” (page 1,048). 
Information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders will also create conditions 
that spark off relational lending [Boot (2000)], where banks and borrowers, especially firms, 
engage in exclusive and long-term relationships. The specific investment costs of establishing 
a borrower-lender relationship are likely to be shared between the borrower and the bank, 
in a similar way as it happens with the costs of building a retail depositor relationship. For this 
reason the credit market can be modeled under the assumption of quantity adjustment costs 
and, if this is the case, loan interest rate rigidity will be determined by the quantity adjustment 
cost model described before. 
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2.6 Asymmetric behaviour 
The assumption that interest rate adjustments towards their long-term values is symmetric is 
implicit in the analysis above; in other words, we have assumed so far that the adjustment 
takes place at the same speed when the interest rate of the economy increases than when 
decreases. However, previous research has found mixed evidences on the asymmetries 
in the adjustment process of interest rates. For example Hannan and Berger (1991), Neumark 
and Sharpe (1992), and De Graeve et al. (2004) find evidence of asymmetry on deposits; and 
Arak et al. (1983), Ausubel (1989), and Calem and Mester (1995) find the same in the case of 
loans, while Berstein and Fuentes (2003) do not. Moreover, the asymmetry is often in the 
direction that banks take more time to adjust interest rates when such adjustment is going to 
favour customers (i.e. upward interest rate adjustment on deposits and downward in loans). 
Asymmetry in interest rate adjustments is difficult to explain from the model 
presented above, where banks have always incentives to set the profit maximising price and 
the adjustment cost function is itself symmetric. The assumption often made to explain 
asymmetries is that banks tend to keep deposit interest rates low and delay rises when the 
money market interest rate increases. However, this would not be consistent with profit 
maximising behaviour if such delay is longer than the one dictated by equations (3) and (4). 
Thereby, asymmetries should be interpreted and explained in terms of non-symmetric costs 
and benefits for the banks of changing interest rates. For example, Okun’s (1981) argument 
of negative consumers’ reactions to unstable prices and, specially their negative reactions to 
unfavourable price changes, will imply asymmetries in the cost function resulting in upward 
price rigidity. In the case of deposits, this would mean downward interest rate rigidity, the 
contrary to what the empirical analysis find. Therefore, this reasoning does not lead to a good 
explanation of what is empirically observed. 
Other argument might be the following. If banks collude, all of them would apparently 
want to adjust their interest rates at the speed determined by the transmission parameter, 
that is, the profit maximising one. Nevertheless, if banks have imperfect information or 
different believes about future evolution of monetary or real economic conditions, collusion 
may be more difficult to sustain. Because of this, banks will delay interest rate adjustments 
that might be viewed as cheating behaviour until they are sure that the other banks are aware 
of the fact that the change is in response to changing market conditions and consequently, it 
is not a violation of the collusive agreement. In accordance with this idea, in case of deposits, 
interest rate rises are more likely to be interpreted as cheating behaviour than interest rates 
decreases; then, banks may be more reluctant to raise interest rates to the point where the 
price adjustment model dictates than to lower them. Notice, though, that under perfect 
information banks’ pricing behaviour would not deviate from the path determined by 
equation (3) and (4). 
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3 Data and methodology 
The Banco de España started in 1988 to ask for detailed information on interest rates set by 
banks in new operations during the last month. The information requirement covers both 
commercial and savings banks, that is, almost the whole population of Spanish banks.12 The 
interest rate reported by each bank is the average annual interest rate charged in new 
operations of a given product during the corresponding month (i.e. the marginal interest rate). 
On the asset side, the products for which interest rates are available include discounting 
of receivables, credit line facilities, personal loans without collateral, and mortgages. 
Most mortgages are long-term loans (maturity of three years or more). As for the rest of the 
loans, they are broken down in periods of different maturity: up to 3 months, between 3 
months and 1 year, between 1 year and 3 years and more than 3 years. On the liability side, 
banks declare interest rates paid on current accounts (sight deposits that include check 
facilities), savings accounts (sight deposits that do not incorporate any check facility), term 
deposits, and repo-type deposits (deposits backed by the bank with a public debt 
instrument). On this side, the maturity break down is the following: up to 3 months, from 3 
to 6 months, from 6 months to 1 year, from 1 to 2 years and more than 2 years. 
We will restrict our analysis to the most common maturity of loan and deposit 
products. Thereby, we will consider throughout the analysis, on the one hand, discounting 
of receivables up to 3 months, credit line facilities with a maturity varying between 1 
and 3 years, personal loans until 3 months and mortgages (as mentioned above always with a 
maturity superior to 3 years). On the liability side, we will consider current and savings 
accounts, deposits and repo-type deposits; the last two, both with a maturity of less 
than 3 months. Overall, we have information on monthly quoted annual interest rates for 
around 150 banks during 172 months (December 1988 to March 2003) and 8 different 
banking products. The data employed are actual transaction prices (including commissions) 
and contains numerous observations of increases and decreases. This allows for a complete 
investigation of asymmetries in the adjustment of prices up and downward. 
Figure 1 shows the evolution over time of the average loan and deposit interest 
rates charged by Spanish banks in the sample. It also shows the time evolution of the 
one-year EURIBOR (MIBOR before 1999) that will be used as the money market interest 
rate. The figure shows that interest rates remain high and stable during the 
first part of the sample period (1988 to 1993); afterwards, they decline sharply in the middle 
of it (1994 to 1998); and finally, they remain again stable at lower values at the end of 
the sample period (1999 to 2003). From 1999 Spain is a member of the European Monetary 
Union, therefore the figure makes clear the consequences in terms of lower interest rates that 
produced the period of nominal convergence in Spain. In the empirical analysis we shall focus 
on the issue of whether the Euro has changed the pattern of interest rates adjustment in 
Spain. 
                                                                          
12. Information on interest rates posted by credit cooperatives is not available, but in any case, this kind of entities does 
not even represent a 5% of total deposits. 
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The empirical econometric model behind equation (3) and (4) is the so-called Partial 
Adjustment Model (PAM).13 The model determines first the long run interest rate target and 
later the short term adjustment process. The empirical counterpart of equation (3) will be 
formulated as 
itttt
dl
it GDPRr ναααα +∆+Π++= 3210, , (3’) 
where tR  is the EURIBOR interest rate, α1 is the long run adjustment proportion or 
pass-through rate; tΠ  and tGDP∆  are the inflation rate and the growth rate of the real 
gross domestic product (GDP), respectively. The inflation rate and the GDP growth rate are 
introduced into the model to control for changes over time of the macroeconomic conditions 
that may affect the demand for loans and the supply of deposits. 
Let
dl
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be the target level of the interest rate of the product for bank i in period t, 
predicted from equation (3’). The short-term adjustment process [equation (4)], is formulated 
according to the following empirical counterpart, 
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where tΠ , 1−Π t  are current and lagged values of the inflation rate and tGDP∆ , 1−∆ tGDP  
are current and lagged values of the GDP growth rate. These variables will control for external 
shocks that affect the short-term adjustment process. 
The PAM of equations (3’) and (4’) will be estimated for the whole time period and for 
each of the three sub-periods, 1988-1993, 1994-1998, 1999-2003; then, the partition of the 
sample will allow us to test for the stability of the PAM over time. Second, equation (4’) will 
be estimated allowing for asymmetries in the adjustment rate δ depending on whether the 
money market interest rate goes up or goes down. The hypothesis of symmetry will also be 
tested. 
Beyond the estimation of the pass-through (α1) and the transmission parameter (δ) 
for each bank and product, our interest is to explain the values of the transmission 
parameter as a function of variables that came out of the theoretical analysis. The explanatory 
variables of the parameter δ considered in this paper are (1) market concentration, (2) size of 
the bank, (3) ownership form of the bank, (4) market growth and (5) credit risk of the bank. 
Each one of the fifty Spanish provinces is considered as a different geographic 
market. Province concentration is measured by the Herfindahl index (i.e. the sum of 
squared market shares of banks’ loans in the province in year t). A bank is assigned to a 
province if it has at least one operating branch in it. Each bank is assigned a concentration 
value (Hit) equal to the weighted Herfindahl index of each of the provinces where the bank 
has branches, using as weights the proportion of total loans of the bank in the province. 
Concentration is a variable directly related to the predictions of the model. Under supply 
adjustment costs and oligopoly market with homogeneous products, the theory predicts that 
                                                                          
13. Alternatively, the adjustment model could be formulated as a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model that allows 
for different values of the transmission parameter over time. The PAM approach used in the paper is the one that 
comes directly from the market competition model of section 2. 
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the transmission parameter will decrease with the Herfindahl index at a decreasing rate. If the 
decision to change interest rates and the amount of the change are indistinguishable, then 
the observed interest rates changes may also be influenced by menu costs, but now 
concentration would have a non-decreasing negative effect in the adjustment speed. 
As to the size of the bank (SHit), it is equal to total assets divided by the total assets 
of the banking system in year t. Size can be a source of bank differentiation if for example, 
larger banks have a better reputation or a larger and more convenient network of branches. 
Besides, it may affect the adjustment cost function of the bank. Overall, the net effect of 
these forces in the adjustment speed is an empirical question. 
Concerning the type of bank, the categorical variable Bi takes value 1 if the finantial 
institution is a commercial bank and 0 in case of a savings bank. It is often argued that 
savings banks have more loyal customers than commercial banks; moreover their customers 
are often viewed as less sophisticated and less informed than customers of commercial 
banks. If this is true, savings banks will face flatter supply and demand functions than 
commercial banks and, for a given competitive behaviour and similar values of the other 
parameters, this would imply higher adjustment speed for savings banks under supply 
adjustment costs (lower under menu costs). 
Finally, market growth and credit risk can be considered variables that control for 
markets and banks heterogeneity. Market growth is measured by the population annual 
growth rate in a given province in year t. As in the case of concentration, each bank has been 
assigned a market growth rate (POPit) equal to the weighted sum of growth rates in each of 
the provinces with operating branches. As for the credit risk of the bank, it is measured by the 
doubtful debt ratio, that is, the ratio of bad loans over total loans in year t (DDRit). 
Since there might be other banks’ unobserved characteristics that could affect price 
adjustment decisions (differences in adjustment costs, credit line [Berger and Udell (1992)] 
and capital channel [Kashyap and Stein (2000)] effects), we complete the model with 
individual bank fixed effects. Then, the adjustment parameter δ for bank i in period t can be 
written as a function of these explanatory variables as follows, 
itititit
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where φi are the bank fixed effects and ξ is a random disturbance. According to the theory, 
the only clear predictions consistent with all explanations of price rigidity are that ψ1 is 
expected to be negative and ψ2, non-negative. The values and signs of the rest of parameters 
are an empirical question. 
Table 2 shows, for each sub-period of time (1988-1993; 1994-1998; and 
1999-2003), some descriptive statistics of the inflation and the GDP growth rates plus some 
statistics measures for the explanatory variables of the transmission parameter. As it can 
be seen, market concentration, although increasing over time, is rather low; for example, 
by the middle of the sample period an average bank faces around 12 competitors of equal 
size. The average size of the bank, measured by its market share, also shows an increasing 
trend over time, although the median stays more stable. Average population growth is much 
higher at the end of the period, probably due to the effect of immigration. Macroeconomic 
conditions, as shown by the time evolution of the GDP growth rate and the inflation rate, 
improve over time. The same happens with the doubtful debt ratio, which represent on 
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average over 3% of total loans during the first sub-period, and only 1.5% ten years later. 
Finally, both the number of commercial and the number of savings banks decrease over time 
due to mergers.14 
                                                                          
14. When banks merge the new entity is considered a new bank. 
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4 Empirical results 
4.1 Pass-through and transmission parameters 
Results of the estimation of the PAM [equations (3’) and (4’)] are presented in tables 3 A 
and B. Table 3A shows the estimated values of the pass-through parameter (α1), while 
table 3B shows the estimated values of the transmission parameter (δ). In each case, the 
parameter estimates are shown for three different cases. First, the statistics of the 
pass-through parameter are the mean, standard deviation and median of the parameters 
obtained from the PAM estimated for each individual bank; these estimates are identified 
as “bank level”. Results of the second estimation, denoted by “pool level” estimates, are 
obtained by pooling all banks and estimating the PAM model under the restriction of 
each coefficient being equal for all banks. Finally, the so-called “bank average” estimates 
come from a PAM where using the average monthly interest rate of all banks. In order to 
increase the efficiency of the estimation we use a Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimation 
(SURE), stating a different equation for each bank and/or banking product. 
Throughout the estimation, the null hypothesis of structural stability of the PAM over 
time is tested for each bank product. The hypothesis is rejected at high confidence levels; 
for that reason, table 3C reports the bank level estimates of the transmission parameter δ for 
each of the three five-year periods in which the whole sample period is divided up. 
In tables 3B and 3C we also report the bank level estimates of the transmission parameter 
for increases (+) and decreases (-) of the money market interest rate. 
Pass-through estimates 
The “pool level” and the “bank average” estimates of the pass-through parameters (table 3A) 
are fairly similar, and in all cases, both of them are higher than the mean and median values of 
the “bank level” estimates. The dispersion among the estimated pass-through parameters of 
individual banks is substantial in all banking products and moreover, with the exception of 
savings account, the median is above the mean. The distribution of estimated bank 
coefficients is more concentrated on the right tail and this explains why the median values are 
closer to the “pool” and “bank average” estimates than the means. 
A reference value for the pass-through parameter (α1) is 1, that is, the value that the 
parameter would take in the perfectly competitive solution or just if changes in the money 
market interest rate were fully transmitted to loan and deposit interest rates. “Pool level” 
estimates of the pass-through parameter are close to 1 in some of the products, especially 
mortgages (with an estimated value of 0.973); but the null hypothesis that the coefficient is 
equal to 1 is rejected at the 5% level –or less– in all cases. Overall, estimated pass-through 
coefficients for loan products are larger than those for deposit products. 
By looking at the “bank level estimates” the conclusions to be reached are 
similar. The proportion of banks for which the estimated pass-through coefficient takes a 
value lower than 1 goes from 65% in personal loans to 98% in savings accounts. And overall, 
it is higher among deposit products (96% on average) than among loan products (the highest 
of which is 83% in mortgages). Taking into account only those coefficients which are 
statistically significant at the 5% confidence level, the above proportions are lower especially 
in loan products (values in parenthesis). The highest proportion of coefficients that are 
significantly lower than 1, corresponds to current accounts (94%); and the lowest, to personal 
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loans (47%). Overall, for deposit products, the “bank level” estimations of table 3A can 
be considered in line with those obtained by Hannan and Liang (1993) for consumer’s 
deposits in the US, but with the exception of savings accounts where our results 
show lowerpass-through coefficients than for the US market.15 As in the US, the conclusion is 
that estimated values of the pass-through parameters suggest that banks have some 
market power but the amount of it differs among products. 
The values of the pass-through parameters have economic significance for 
the evolution of the profit margins of banks over time. For loan products, the average value 
of the pass-through parameter from the median estimates is 0.85, while for the same median 
estimates in the case of deposits the average is 0.54 (0.65 if savings are excluded). 
A 100 basic points (bp) increase in the money market interest rate implies an 85 bp increase 
in long run average loan interest rate and 54 bp increase in the average deposit interest rate. 
That is a net difference of 30 bp or a long-run increase in gross profits of 30 cents for each 
euro of deposits (20 cents if savings accounts are excluded). Of course, if the money market 
interest rate declines, gross profits per unit will be reduced by the same magnitude. Since 
during the period of study the fall in interest rates has been the general trend, differences in 
the pass-through parameters of loans and deposits explain a good part of the decrement 
in the intermediation margin of Spanish banks during this period. 
Transmission estimates 
The estimated transmission parameters (δ) for the whole sample period are presented in 
table 3B. In comparison with the “bank level” estimates (mean and median values), the “pool” 
and the “bank average” level estimates for the whole period (last two columns) are 
substantially lower. This also stands true when we permit a different transmission parameter 
for every single sub-period (table 3C). Therefore, the bias from forcing a common value of the 
transmission parameter for all banks and sub-periods in a given market gives more distorted 
results in the transmission parameter than in the pass-through parameter. The mean and 
median of the “bank level” estimates show substantial differences among products. With 
respect to this, the transmission parameter δ is particularly high for credit line facilities and 
personal loans. In general, loan products show a higher speed of transmission than deposit. 
One way to evaluate the economic significance of the estimations in table 3 is to 
obtain the proportion of change in the money market interest rate that is transmitted to loan 
and deposit interest rates after a certain number of time periods, for example after the first 
month. This proportion will be equal to the ratio between the transmission parameter (δ) and 
the pass-through parameter (α1). Using median values of the transmission and pass-through 
parameters from tables 3A and 3B, the proportion of the transmitted change in case of 
loan products in one month ranges from 23% in receivables to around 60% in credit lines and 
personal loans (30% for mortgages). Among deposit products, the proportion values cluster 
around 40% in all products, except savings accounts with a value of 80%. Thus, although 
savings accounts have a low estimated median value of the transmission parameter, they also 
have very low median estimate of the pass-through parameter; thereby, the transmission is 
completed in a short period of time. 
                                                                          
15. The null hypothesis that the pass-through parameter is equal to ½, the predicted value for linear supply and demand 
functions under monopoly or monopolistic competition, is rejected in the majority of cases looking at the bank level 
estimates. 
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4.2 Asymmetric transmissions 
Equation (3’) and (4’) of the PAM system are estimated allowing for asymmetric adjustment 
speed when money market interest rates go up or down. The estimation is performed for the 
whole period of time and for each sub-period. 
The test of equal transmission parameters for upward or downward movements in 
the interest rates yielded the following results. At the pool level, the null hypothesis of equality 
was rejected the least at a significance level of 5%. As regards the bank level estimates, at 
a 5% significance level the null hypothesis was rejected for 87% of the banks in receivables 
and credit lines, 75% in personal loans, 92% in mortgages, 83% in current accounts, 85% in 
savings accounts, 80% in deposits and 83% in repo-type deposits. 
Table 3B presents a summary of the asymmetric transmission parameters estimated 
for the whole sample period; and table 3C displays the same whereas dividing it up into 
the three sub-periods pointed out above. For deposit products, the mean and median values 
of the transmission parameters for interest rate declines (-) are systematically higher than the 
mean and median values for interest rate increments (+) (table 3B). That means that deposits 
are more upward rigid, which is consistent with the general view that prices are downward 
inflexible but firms react faster to shocks that imply price increases (decreases in case of 
deposits). 
For loans, results are mixed. Looking at the means, the adjustment speed is higher in 
the case of upward movements in mortgages and credit lines but the reverse holds for 
receivables and personal loans. However, if we compare median values, loan interest rates 
are more upward rigid only in the case of personal loans. In the case of mortgages, the 
observed pattern of interest rigidity is in line with that observed in deposits after taking into 
account that banks apply mark downs to the money market interest rate to determine deposit 
rates and mark ups to loans. It may just reflect that the collateral secures the loan and 
therefore the credit quality of the borrower is not relevant for the loan decision. 
The relative lower transmission speed in upward than in downward changes in 
personal loans (and receivables if we take mean values instead of medians) is consistent 
with the prediction from adverse selection and credit rationing theories of credit markets. 
Credit line is a loan with maturity up to three years and the other loans are short-term loans. 
Moreover, credit lines are often associated with stronger relational lending [Berger and 
Udell (1992)] and banks are well informed about the credit quality of those borrowers that 
receive this type of loans. 
4.3 Tests for differences in pass-through and transmission parameters over time, 
across products and type of bank 
One of the questions of interest is the evolution, if any, of pass-through and transmission 
parameters over time and, in particular, if these parameters change after 1999 –when Spain 
joined the EMU–. In this section we explain the pass-through and the transmission 
parameters estimates from (3’) and (4’) for each of the time sub-periods (1998-1993; 
1994-1998; and 1999-2003) using time, product and bank dummy variables as explanantory 
variables (table 4). 
The first block of estimations refers to the pass-through parameter and the 
second one, to the transmission parameter. To model the pass-through parameter (α1) as a 
function of market structure and bank level variables, we follow Hannan and Liang (1993). 
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The transmission parameter is modeled according to equation (5). For each parameter a 
distinction is made between the pool of loans and the one of deposit products. Moreover, 
within loans (deposits), we present estimation with bank fixed effects and another with 
these effects substituted by the dummy variable (Bi) that takes the value 1 if the bank is a 
commercial bank and 0 if it is a savings bank.16 In all models the omitted time dummy 
variable is the one corresponding to the period 1994-1998, when the money market interest 
rate follows a decreasing trend. 
Concerning the pass-through parameter for loans, the first two columns of table 4, 
the coefficient of D1 is negative and significant [-0.23 (p=0.001)], but the coefficient of D3 is 
positive but not significant [0.057(p=0.62)]. In the period characterized by nominal interest 
rate convergence (1994-1998), in order to prepare for the Euro, Spanish banks increase the 
loan pass-through parameter with respect to its value in previous years. However, after 1998, 
no statistically significant evidence of further increase in the parameter is detected.17 
Concerning deposit products (columns 3 and 4 of table 4) show that the increase 
in the pass-through parameter occurs during the period 1999-2003 [coefficient of D3 
equal to 0.201 (p=0.00)], while no change is observed from 1989 to 1994 [coefficient of 
D1 equal to -0.014 (p=0.69)]. Now, the increase in competition coincides with the period 
of low nominal interest rates after Spain joined the EMU. 
The same analysis for changes over time for the transmission parameter δ (last four 
columns of table 4) only finds clear evidence of an increase in the parameter value for loans 
in the period from 1994 to 1998 [coefficient of D1 equal to -0.106 (p=0.00) in column 5], 
exactly the same period in which we see an increase in the pass-through parameter. None of 
the coefficients of the rest of the time dummy variables is significant at the 5% of confidence 
level. The conclusion is that, when we control for other variables that may affect the value of 
the transmission parameter, the pattern of interest rate rigidity remains unchanged for the 
most part during the 15 years analysed. 
The comparison of the pass-through and transmission parameters across products 
controlling for time, bank and market effects (coefficients of product dummy variables 
in table 4) confirms most of the conclusions reached in table 3. Among loan products, the 
pass-through parameter is lower in receivables than in the rest of loans, coefficients 
of product dummies in column 1 significant and with values between 0.12 and 0.18. 
The dispersion is higher in deposits where savings accounts have the lowest pass-through 
and repo-type deposits, the highest; with a difference between them of 0.561 (column 3 
of table 4). 
In contrast, transmission parameters are very similar among deposit products; none 
of the coefficients of the product dummies are statistically significant in column 7 of the table. 
On the other hand, there are substantial differences among loans (column 5); receivables and 
mortgages have the lowest transmission parameters and credit lines and personal loans 
exhibit the highest, with a difference up to 0.31. 
                                                                          
16. The estimation of the model takes into account that the pass-through and the transmission parameter are both 
estimated values and therefore have a known error term. The estimation procedure is the same as that used by Hannan 
and Liang (1993). 
17. Hannan and Liang (1993) give conditions under which increases in the pass-through parameter can be 
interpreted as less market power. For a further discussion of the evolution of market power of Spanish banks 
see Carbó et al. (2005), Maudos and Fernández (2004), and Maudos and Pérez (2003). 
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The average pass-through parameter of commercial banks is statistically higher 
that the average pass-through of savings banks, as the positive value and statistical 
significance of the coefficient of Bi (columns 2 and 4). The estimated value of the coefficient is 
around 0.10 in loans and in deposits. According to this measure, savings banks have more 
market power than commercial banks.18 
Concerning the transmission parameter the difference in the value of the estimated 
parameter appears as statistically significant in the case of loans (column 6); and again, 
commercial banks have, on average, a higher transmission parameter than savings banks 
[coefficient of Bi equal to 0.063 (p=0.00)]. 
Table 4 also shows the estimated coefficients of bank and geographic market 
variables for the pool of loan and deposit products. We find no evidence of statistical 
significance for the coefficients of variables such as relative size of the bank, market 
concentration, market population growth and bad loans in the model that explains 
the pass-through parameter. This contrasts with the results of Hannan and Liang (1993) who 
find higher pass-through parameter for deposit products in less concentrated credit markets 
(our estimated coefficient of Hit is also negative, but not significant, in column 4 of the table). 
The coefficients of market concentration and its square are both statistically 
significant when the dependent variable is the transmission parameter. The estimated 
coefficient are, respectivelly, negative and positive; that is, increases in market concentration 
first lower the transmission parameter but increase the adjustment speed beyond certain 
values of Hit [the inflexion point is around a Herfindahl value of 11%, above the median values 
of the concentration index in the sample data aproximately equal to 8%19 (table 2)]. 
Among the rest of explanatory variables only POPit (population growth in the market) 
shows a positive and significant coefficient among loan products. 
4.4 Joint estimation for each individual product 
Our interest now is to estimate the parameters of equation (5) for each bank product. In order 
to increase the number of observations and the efficiency of the estimation, equation (5) will 
be estimated jointly with equation (4’). To do so the transmission parameter function in (5) is 
substituted in (4’) and the expanded model is estimated by SURE with banks’ fixed effects. 
The predicted long-term interest rate r* used in the estimation is obtained from (3’) estimated 
separately in the three time periods considered (1988-1993; 1994-1998; and 1999-2003) to 
account for changes in the long-term equilibrium relationship over time. Inflation and GDP 
growth rates are two-year lagged to eliminate autocorrelation in the residuals. Table 5 
presents the results of the estimation. 
Most of the estimated coefficients are now statistically significant. For each 
product the relationship between transmission parameter and market concentration is first 
decreasing and later increasing as in the pool estimations of table 5. Moreover, in all cases 
the inflexion point of the Herfindahl index is also around 11%. Therefore the empirical 
evidence of a non monotonic association between the transmission parameter that measures 
                                                                          
18. For further discussion, see Maudos and Pérez (2003). 
19. From equation (5), the derivative of the transmission parameter with respect to H is equal to ψ1-2ψ2H. The value of H 
for which the derivative is equal to 0 is H* = - ψ/ψ2. Substituting for the estimated values of the coefficients for loans for 
example, -0.036 and 0.0032, from table 5, we obtain the value of 11%. 
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the interest rate adjustment speed and the market concentration is robust to the method of 
estimation. The result follows the theoretical prediction from a model of bank competition with 
positive conjectural variations in an oligopoly market with homogeneous products. As we saw 
in the theoretical section, under these assumptions and if we expect higher conjectural 
variations in more concentrated credit market, the effect of higher concentration in the speed 
of price adjustment can be first negative and later positive, just what we observe in the 
empirical estimations. 
The negative and significant coefficient of SHit indicates that the transmission 
parameter of each individual bank decreases with the bank size. However, among 
deposit products, the relationship between relative size and transmission parameter is 
only statistically significant for deposits. The transmission parameter is higher in high growth 
markets for all deposit products and for mortgages and credit lines (positive coefficient 
of POPit). Finally, banks that take more risks in their loans (i.e. higher proportion of doubtful 
loans) exhibit higher transmission parameters [positive coefficient of DDRit; significant except 
for personal loans (negative) and current accounts (not significant)]. 
Table 5 also shows the estimated coefficients for the inflation rate and the 
change in the GDP growth rate, contemporaneous and one-month lagged. The coefficients 
of inflation rate are all positive and highly significant, which indicates that price level 
changes enter into the short-term interest rates adjustment process beyond the inflation 
induced changes in the long run equilibrium interest rate r*. The contemporaneous GDP 
growth rate shows a negative and highly significant coefficient in all products but the 
coefficient of lagged growth is positive although of lower absolute value. Therefore, interest 
rate adjustments tend to be counter cyclical. 
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5 Conclusions 
The relationship between market power of banks and interest rate adjustment speed is a 
complex issue since predictions about the expected sign of the effect of the former on the 
later depend on structural characteristics of the markets and, in some cases, on banks’ 
characteristics. This paper presents a thorough analysis of the determinants of the interest 
rate adjustment speed (1) under monopoly and competitive behaviour in fixing prices, (2) 
under oligopoly with no product differentiation, and (3) under the assumption that adjustment 
costs obey to changes in prices –as in menu costs– or alternatively, to changes in the 
quantity supplied. The variety of situations suggests that the actual relationship between 
sources of market power and price rigidity is an empirical question where the interpretation of 
the results has to be made with a precise description of the theoretical results. 
The results of the paper confirm that Spanish banks have some market power in the 
sense that the long run relationship parameter between the majority of loan and deposit 
interest rates and the money market interest rate (pass-through parameter) is lower than 1. 
Additionally, this parameter is higher in loans than in deposits, which means that the marginal 
long-run gross profit margin (difference between loan and deposit interest rates) under 
changes in the money market interest rate is positive (it is approximately 30 bp during the 
studied period). Therefore, banks’gross profits increase (decrease) when the money market 
interest rate increases (decreases).  
The pass-through parameter increases in loans during the period of nominal 
convergence of the Spanish economy (1994 to 1998) but remains stable afterwards during 
the Euro years. In deposits the increase in the estimated value of the parameter is 
observed after 1999 (Euro years). Therefore, we have mixed results on whether banks have 
decreased their market power in the period after Spain joined the EMU and nominal money 
market interest rates are historically low. The pass-through parameter tends to be higher for 
commercial banks than for savings banks. However, contrary to Hannan and Liang (1993) 
for deposits in the US, we find no statistical significance for the relationship between the 
pass-through parameter and market concentration. 
As for the transmission parameters, the empirical analysis confirms that interest rates 
are rigid to changes in the money market interest rate and also confirms asymmetries in the 
speed at which loan or deposit interest rates adjust to the money market one. In the case of 
deposits, shocks that imply interest rate decreases are translated into actual interest rate 
decisions at a lower speed than those shocks that produce interest rate increases. In the 
case of loans the evidence suggests that the observed asymmetry can also be the 
consequence of adverse selection and credit rationing by banks since for unsecured loans 
the transmission parameter is lower in interest rate increases than in decreases. 
The transmission parameters vary systematically as a function of variables that can 
be related with parameters of the theoretical model. In particular, we find a non-monotonic 
negative effect of market concentration on the adjustment speed consistent with a 
combination of structural (number of competitors) and behavioural (collusion) effects 
of opposite direction on the relationship between market concentration and price 
rigidity obtained in the theoretical analysis. The convex relationship between the transmission 
parameter and market concentration suggests that banks face quantity adjustment costs and 
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that they compete in oligopoly markets on rather homogeneous products. Moreover, 
it contrasts with the linear positive relationship between interest rates rigidity and 
market concentration found by Hannan and Berger (1991) in deposit interest rates in US 
under the assumption of menu costs. 
We also find that savings banks tend to show lower values of the transmission 
parameters for loan products than commercial banks. In a model of quantity adjustment 
costs this evidence would be consistent with higher slope of the loan demand (less market 
power) of savings banks than of commercial banks. In addition, it might be due to the 
fact that savings banks tend to specialize more in mortgages (a less differentiated product 
than loans to business firms and therefore a more competitive market) than commercial 
banks. In deposit products we observe the opposite result, that is, lower transmission 
parameter for savings banks, but the coefficient is not statistically significant. 
The transmission parameter decreases with size of banks especially in loan 
products. Again, in a situation of quantity adjustment costs this evidence is consistent 
with higher slope of the loan demand (in absolute values) for large banks than for small 
banks. Maybe larger banks deal with larger borrowers with more opportunities to 
choose (banks, capital markets and generated cash flow) than small banks, and for this 
reason, they end up with higher slope and less market power. As for the rest of the control 
variables, the results show that banks in high growth geographic markets tend to adjust 
interest rates faster than banks in low growth markets, especially in deposit products. 
Banks which are willing to take more credit risk tend to have a higher transmission parameter 
and generate less interest rate rigidity than more conservative banks. Finally, controlling for 
market power and cost adjustment effects, changes in interest rates are counter-cyclical, 
negatively related to increases in GDP growth and respond positively to inflation beyond the 
effect of price level changes incorporated in the long-term interest rate. 
The results of the paper have some policy implications. Under quantity adjustment 
costs that come out of depositors and borrowers, specific investments in their relationship 
with banks there can be a trade-off between static efficiency (relative profit margin) and 
dynamic efficiency (less price rigidity). This trade-off does not occur in sitituations of direct 
costs of changing prices since here, factors that favour less market power also imply less 
price rigidity. One of the variables affected by this trade-off is market concentration, since the 
paper finds that beyond reasonable concentration levels higher concentration implies lower 
interest rate rigidity and possibly more market power of banks. 
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Table 1. Comparative statics of the effect of market structure and bank behaviour on 
the profit margin and the transmission parameter, under different assumptions on 
adjustment costs and product characteristics 
A positive (negative) sign indicates that the Lerner index and/or the transmission parameter 
increases (decreases) with an increase of the deposit supply slope, the number of firms 
and the conjectural variations parameter. By “indirect effect” we refer to the effect of 
increasing the number of competitors through changes in other parameters, such as 
conjectural variations or the slope of each individual bank supplies. Results follow from the 
findings of section two. 
 
Transmission parameter  
Quantity adjustment costs Price adjustment costs 
 
Profit margin 
(Lerner index) Monopoly 
and 
Competition
Oligopoly 
(homogeneous 
product) 
Monopoly  
Oligopoly 
(spatial 
differentiation) 
MARKET 
STRUCTURE 
     
Slope of the 
supply function (β) - - - + + 
Number of 
competitors 
     
Direct effect (n) - na + na na 
Indirect effect [ν(n)] - na - na + 
Indirect effect [β(n)] - - na  na* na 
COLLUSIVE 
BEHAVIOR (ν) + na + na - 
 
Note: na: not applicable. 
* Increasing in n under Monopolistic Competition, Hannan and Berger (1991) 
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Figure 1.  EURIBOR (interbank market interest rate) and loan and deposit interest 
rates and from 1988 to 2002 
Loan and deposit interest rates reported are linear averages of actual interest charged by 
Spanish banks. Interest rates refer to December of each year. 
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Table 2.  Mean, standard deviation and median values of the explanatory variables of 
the pass-through and the transmission parameters in three time sub-periods 
Herfindahl index and annual population growth rates refer to the fifty Spanish provinces. 
Relative size (bank i assets over total bank assets) and doubtful debt ratio (defaulted loans 
over total loans) are variables computed at bank level. GDP growth and inflation rates are 
values for the Spanish economy as a whole. Commercial banks are for profit companies, 
while savings banks are not for profit commercial institutions. 
 
 
 1988-1993 1994-1998 1999-2003 
 Average 
Std. 
dev. 
Median Average 
Std. 
dev. 
Median Average 
Std. 
dev. 
Median 
Herfindahl . index (%) 5.377 3.177 5.511 7.518 3.015 7.552 8.595 4.015 9.713 
Relative size (%) .487 1.082 .149 .619 1.293 .183 .720 1.587 .185 
Pop. growth (%) .395 .312 .443 -.245 .265 -.264 1.703 .766 1.859 
Doubt. debt ratio (%) 2.715 2.794 2.293 3.121 3.954 2.355 1.147 3.218 .605 
GDP growth rate (%)  2.155 1.085 2.251 3.132 .256 3.190 3.379 .376 3.265 
Inflation rate (%) 5.953 .399 5.988 3.443 .422 3.353 3.056 .259 3.138 
No. of comm. banks 103 99 81 
No. of savings banks 67 52 50 
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Table 3A.  Statistical distribution of the pass-through rate estimates (α1) 
α1 is the estimated coefficient of the variable money market interest rate (R) in a model where 
the dependent variable is the product interest rate and we include the GDP growth and the 
inflation rates as control variables [equation (3’)]. “Bank level estimates” are obtained by fitting 
model (3’) to monthly individual bank data for each product. Additionally, in order to avoid the 
effect of outliers, we assign observations below the 5th and above the 95th percentile to its 
respective percentile value. “Pool level estimates” are obtained forcing an equal pass-through 
rate for each bank in a given product, although including bank dummies and estimating 
by SURE a different equation for assets and deposits. “Bank average estimates” are obtained 
from a SURE estimation of model (3’) using as dependent variable the average interest 
charged by all banks in month t for each individual product. “Significantly <1” refers to the 
percentage of bank level estimated coefficients for which the null hypothesis (that is, value 
less than one) could not be rejected at the 5% confidence level). N indicates number of 
monthly observations used in the estimation. 
 
 
 Bank level estimates 
Pool level 
estimates 
Bank average 
estimates 
 N 
Average 
coeff. 
Average 
std. dev. 
Median 
Percent of α1<1 
(significantly <1) 
Coeff. Std. dev. Coeff. Std. dev. 
Receivable 159 .688 .359 .808 78 (77) .900 .008 .932 .040 
Credit line 162 .768 .250 .822 81 (62) .920 .007 .935 .026 
Personal loan 153 .746 .424 .874 65 (47) .891 .019 .870 .026 
Mortgage 150 .736 .336 .879 83 (67) .973 .006 .938 .029 
Current acc. 181 .457 .235 .478 97 (94) .568 .008 .557 .020 
Savings acc. 155 .209 .224 .179 98 (83) .353 .009 .282 .018 
Deposit 140 .641 .238 .686 93 (56) .754 .005 .747 .023 
Repo-type 151 .736 .219 .805 96 (80) .793 .007 .808 .023 
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Table 3B.  Statistical distribution of the transmission rate estimates (δ) 
δ is the estimated coefficient of the variable constructed as the difference between predicted 
interest rates (r*) from equation (3’) and current interest rates. The estimation follows from a 
model where the dependent variable is the change in interest rate in month t and including 
the GDP growth and the inflation rates (current and one period lagged) as control variables 
[equation (4’)]. “Bank level estimates” are obtained by fitting equation (4’) to monthly 
individual bank data for each product and using SURE; besides, in order to avoid the effect of 
outliers, we assign observations below the 5th and above the 95th percentile to its respective 
percentile value. “Pool level estimates” are obtained forcing an equal pass-through rate for 
each bank in a given product. “Bank average estimates” are obtained from a SURE 
estimation of equation (4’) using as dependent variable the average interest charged by all 
banks in month t for each individual product. “Bank average estimates” are obtained from a 
SURE estimation of equation (4’) for each individual product, using monthly averages of bank 
interest rates. Columns δ+(-) correspond to the parameters of the distribution of SURE bank 
level transmission parameters from equation (4’), when the adjustment towards the long run 
interest rate requires an increase (decrease) in current interest rate. N is the number of 
monthly observations used in the estimation. 
 
 
  Bank level estimates 
 δiT δ+iT δ-iT 
Pool level 
estimates 
Bank average 
estimates 
 
N 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Coeff. 
Std. 
dev. 
Coeff. 
Std. 
dev. 
Receivable 159 .255 .198 .249 .194 .267 .151 .080 .003 .107 .011 
Credit line 162 .503 .467 .557 .522 .440 .431 .279 .003 .191 .019 
Personal loan 153 .535 .523 .474 .488 .574 .525 .181 .006 .228 .023 
Mortgage 150 .331 .261 .369 .298 .288 .222 .203 .005 .127 .013 
Current 180 .261 .189 .210 .143 .305 .224 .075 .003 .101 .014 
Savings 155 .211 .144 .186 .095 .239 .163 .042 .003 .070 .012 
Deposits 140 .303 .271 .239 .169 .278 .225 .147 .004 .163 .013 
Repo-type 
deposits 
150 .346 .317 .309 .258 .376 .368 .162 .005 .240 .028 
 
Table 3C.  Statistical distribution in three sub-periods of the transmission rate estimates (δ) 
δ is the estimated coefficient of the variable constructed as the difference between predicted interest rates (r*) from equation (3’) and current interest rates. The estimation follows from a 
model where the dependent variable is the change in interest rate in month t and including the GDP growth and the inflation rates (current and one period lagged) as control variables 
[equation (4’)]. “Bank level estimates” are obtained by fitting equation (4’) to monthly individual bank data for each product and using SURE; besides, in order to avoid the effect of 
outliers, we assign observations below the 5th and above the 95th percentile to its respective percentile value. “Pool level estimates” are obtained forcing an equal pass-through rate for 
each bank in a given product. “Bank average estimates” are obtained from a SURE estimation of equation (4’) using as dependent variable the average interest charged by all banks in 
month t for each individual product. “Bank average estimates” are obtained from a SURE estimation of equation (4’) for each individual product, using monthly averages of bank interest 
rates. The columns δ+(-) correspond to the parameters of the distribution of SURE bank level transmission parameters from equation (4’), when the adjustment towards the long run 
interest rate requires an increase (decrease) in current interest rate. N is the number of monthly observations used in the estimation. 
 
 1988-1993 1994-1998 1999-2003 
 δiT δ+iT δ-iT δiT δ+iT δ-iT δiT δ+iT δ-iT 
 
N 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
N 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
N 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Receivable 148 .374 .288 .351 .304 .385 .298 121 .370 .300 .422 .369 .329 .243 101 .416 .349 .466 .421 .345 .276 
Credit line 145 .586 .541 1.147 1.058 .495 .479 123 .783 .755 1.552 1.496 .696 .667 105 .782 .767 1.552 1.534 .739 .722 
Personal 
loan 
136 .668 .678 .619 .616 .716 .710 118 .718 .679 .662 .578 .740 .699 93 .766 .763 .670 .635 .822 .850 
Mortgage 135 .460 .364 .538 .455 .379 .277 115 .456 .414 .389 .329 .464 .420 99 .346 .305 .444 .419 .276 .208 
Current 160 .371 .274 .318 .267 .385 .302 146 .421 .364 .315 .253 .475 .448 124 .342 .285 .281 .232 .386 .331 
Savings 137 .387 .317 .343 .222 .393 .364 122 .351 .283 .198 .137 .412 .396 102 .359 .301 .287 .290 .337 .299 
Deposits 103 .355 .276 .314 .249 .377 .252 113 .339 .289 .307 .201 .374 .328 99 .398 .324 .374 .259 .405 .347 
Repo-type 
deposits 
138 .496 .493 .446 .429 .519 .516 119 .202 .168 .172 .081 .245 .232 104 .294 .258 .196 .171 .376 .317 
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Table 4.  Estimation of the pass-though rate (columns 1 to 4) and the transmission 
rate (columns 5 to 8) on their determinants 
P-values are shown in parentheses. In columns 1 to 4 the dependent variable is the estimated 
coefficient of the explanatory variable (R) in equation (3’) for each bank and product in each 
of the three time sub-periods (1988-1993; 1994-1998; and 1999-2003). In columns 5 to 8 
the dependent variable is the estimated coefficient of the explanatory variable (r*-rt-1) 
in equation (4’) for each bank and product in each of the three time sub-periods. 
The explanatory variables are: time dummies (D1 and D3); product type dummies (receivable, 
credit line, personal loans and mortgages for loan products; and current account, savings 
account, deposit and repo-type deposit for deposit products); bank ownership (Bi); Herfindahl 
index (Hit) and squared Herfindahl index (Hit2); population growth rate (POPit); bank relative 
size (SHit), and doubtful debt ratio (DDRit). SURE is run separated for loans and deposits. 
Pooled estimation means that the model is estimated assuming equal slopes of the 
explanatory variables for all loan or deposit products. Columns 1, 3, 5 and 7 include bank 
dummies with estimated coefficients, although they are not reported. In all cases the 
estimation includes an error correction variable to take into account that the dependent 
variables are estimated with a known standard error. 
 
 
Cross section regression with α as the dependent variable Cross section regression with δ as the dependent variable 
Pooled loans Pooled deposits Pooled loans Pooled deposits 
 
Controlling 
for 
individual 
effects 
Including 
a type-of-
bank 
dummy 
 
Controlling 
for 
individual 
effects 
Including 
a type-of-
bank 
dummy 
 
Controlling 
for 
individual 
effects 
Including 
a type-of-
bank 
dummy 
 
Controlling 
for 
individual 
effects 
Including 
a type-of-
bank 
dummy 
D1 
-.228 
(.001) 
-.223 
(.000) D1 
-.009 
(.779) 
-.052 
(.070) D1 
-.103 
(.000) 
-.106 
(.000) 
D1 
.020 
(.290) 
.022 
(.171) 
D3 
.054 
(.633) 
.129 
(.109) D3 
.216 
(.000) 
.192 
(.000) D3 
-.058 
(.092) 
-.023 
(.371) 
D3 
-.012 
(.727) 
-.008 
(.746) 
Credit 
line 
.185 
(.000) 
.156 
(.003) 
Savings 
account 
-.114 
(.000) 
-.112 
(.000) 
Credit 
line 
.319 
(.000) 
.303 
(.000) 
Savings 
account 
-.015 
(.302) 
-.009 
(.560) 
Personal 
loan 
.180 
(.001) 
.171 
(.002) Deposit 
.239 
(.000) 
.228 
(.000) 
Personal 
loan 
.317 
(.000) 
.304 
(.000) 
Deposit 
-.004 
(.801) 
-.014 
(.401) 
Mortgage .118 (.021) 
.115 
(.033) 
Repo-
type dep. 
.448 
(.000) 
.444 
(.000) Mortgage 
.040 
(.006) 
.020 
(.213) 
Repo-
type dep. 
-.007 
(.651) 
-.018 
(.265) 
Bi - 
.112 
(.005) Bi - 
.090 
(.000) Bi - 
.063 
(.000) 
Bi - 
-.014 
(.269) 
Hit 
.002 
(.909) 
.003 
(.696) Hit 
-.000 
(.995) 
-.003 
(.349) Hit 
-.034 
(.000) 
-.047 
(.000) 
Hit 
-.035 
(.000) 
-.037 
(.000) 
(Hit)2 - - (Hit)2 - - (Hit)2 
.001 
(.026) 
.002 
(.000) 
(Hit)2 
.001 
(.035) 
.002 
(.000) 
DDRit 
.009 
(.327) 
.004 
(.608) DDRit 
.009 
(.030) 
.008 
(.038) DDRit 
.002 
(.524) 
.003 
(.227) 
DDRit 
.002 
(.454) 
.001 
(.763) 
POPit 
.039 
(.539) 
-.006 
(.863) POPit 
-.044 
(.164) 
-.024 
(.208) POPit 
.049 
(.009) 
.019 
(.099) 
POPit 
.027 
(.138) 
.018 
(.101) 
SHit 
-.014 
(.716) 
.008 
(.530) SHit 
.003 
(.854) 
.000 
(.979) SHit 
-.007 
(.556) 
-.014 
(.000) 
SHit 
-.018 
(.115) 
-.004 
(.339) 
χ2 309.30 77.54 χ2 1,172.65 498.11 χ2 1,407.35 772.26 χ2 540.63 104.12 
N 1,258 1,258 N 1,258 1,258 N 1,255 1,255 N 1,255 1,255 
Parms. 179 10 Parms. 179 10 Parms. 180 11 Parms. 180 11 
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Table 5.  Joint estimation of the Partial Adjustment Model with equation (5) plugged 
into equation (4’) 
P-values are shown in parentheses. SURE is run separately for each bank product. The 
dependent variable are changes of bank i’s interest rate in month t. The explanatory variables 
are: Herfindahl index (Hit); squared Herfindahl index (Hit2); population growth rate (POPit); bank 
relative size (SHit); and doubtful debt ratio (DDRit). All of them multiplied by the difference 
(r*-rt-1) –expressed in percentage–, where r* is predicted from equation (3’) estimated in each 
time sub-period (1988-1993; 1994-1998; 1999-2003). All regressions include current and 
one-period lagged values of GDP growth and inflation rates and bank specific effects 
(coefficients not reported). 
 
 Receivable Credit line 
Personal 
loan 
Mortgage 
Current 
account 
Savings 
account 
Deposit 
Repo-type 
deposit 
(r*it-rit-1)·const. 
44.130 
(.000) 
27.307 
(.016) 
14.674 
(.255) 
43.642 
(.000) 
13.033 
(.223) 
-66.665 
(.000) 
.010 
(.907) 
-6.324 
(.593) 
(r*it-rit-1)·Hit  
-23.366 
(.000) 
-14.972 
(.000) 
-11.409 
(.000) 
-22.713 
(.000) 
-17.584 
(.000) 
-4.769 
(.057) 
-.141 
(.000) 
-13.978 
(.000) 
(r*it-rit-1)·(Hit)2 
1.090 
(.000) 
.736 
(.000) 
.576 
(.000) 
1.127 
(.000) 
.796 
(.000) 
.248 
(.067) 
.635 
(.000) 
.745 
(.000) 
(r*it-rit-1)·SHit 
-3.461 
(.000) 
-2.915 
(.000) 
-2.484 
(.010) 
-1.703 
(.001) 
-1.110 
(.111) 
-.389 
(.570) 
-2.653 
(.000) 
-.854 
(.289) 
(r*it-rit-1)·POPit 
-.370 
(.471) 
1.895 
(.003) 
.983 
(.180) 
2.782 
(.000) 
4.445 
(.000) 
5.800 
(.000) 
2.004 
(.000) 
3.547 
(.000) 
(r*it-rit-1)·DDRit 
.684 
(.001) 
1.359 
(.000) 
-1.999 
(.000) 
.828 
(.000) 
.536 
(.124) 
1.662 
(.000) 
1.512 
(.000) 
3.113 
(.000) 
Πt 
.700 
(.000) 
.759 
(.000) 
.614 
(.000) 
.757 
(.000) 
.442 
(.000) 
.231 
(.000) 
.553 
(.000) 
.388 
(.000) 
Πt-1 
1.208 
(.000) 
1.289 
(.000) 
1.303 
(.000) 
1.323 
(.000) 
.731 
(.000) 
.326 
(.000) 
.991 
(.000) 
1.071 
(.000) 
∆GDPt 
-.805 
(.000) 
-.590 
(.000) 
-.676 
(.036) 
-.842 
(.000) 
-.424 
(.000) 
-.264 
(.000) 
-.698 
(.000) 
-.971 
(.000) 
∆GDPt-1 
.259 
(.000) 
.101 
(.156) 
.216 
(.103) 
.380 
(.000) 
.147 
(.003) 
.003 
(.938) 
.224 
(.000) 
.296 
(.000) 
χ2 
N 
Parms. 
424,539.86 
8,763 
109 
354,820.96 
8,763 
109 
204,350.76 
8,763 
109 
331,503.34 
8,763 
109 
158,062.72 
8,763 
109 
100,747.28 
8,763 
109 
255,978.45 
8,763 
109 
198,733.41 
8,763 
109 
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